Friday, August 28, 2009
Bull's still running....
Ben Bernanke nearly collapsed a lung patting himself on the back last week at the annual Jackson Hole economic wonk confab. According to the Great One himself, it is only through the heroic efforts of the Fed and Treasury that the financial sun continues to climb above the horizon each morning.
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
Sunday, August 16, 2009
Ben is learning....
"Back in 2002, before he became chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke claimed that if short-term interest rates fell to zero, a central bank still had the ultimate weapon: printing money by purchasing government bonds. Having now actually tried quantitative easing himself, Mr Bernanke is discovering its limits."
― Economist Magazine August 13, 2009
― Economist Magazine August 13, 2009
Saturday, August 15, 2009
What's Next ? Inflation or Deflation or ?
There is no means of avoiding the final collapse of a boom brought about by credit expansion. The alternative is only whether the crisis should come sooner as the result of a voluntary abandonment of further credit (debt) expansion, or later as a final and total catastrophe of the currency system involved.
- Ludwig von Mises
- Ludwig von Mises
Friday, August 14, 2009
Monday, August 10, 2009
Friday, August 7, 2009
Tuesday, August 4, 2009
Greenspan Reports that the Recovery is in progress
Collapse, I think, is now off the table,” said Alan Greenspan over the weekend, pedal to the metal. “I’m pretty sure we’ve already seen the bottom… it’s clear that we’ve turned, perhaps in the middle of last month, the middle of July.”
“I do think it is possible that we could get a second wave down,” he cautioned, literally seconds later. “But the important issue is if we don't -- and I think the probability is that we won't -- that we are close to stabilization.”
So the worst is over, unless it gets bad again.
From Agora Financial 5 min
“I do think it is possible that we could get a second wave down,” he cautioned, literally seconds later. “But the important issue is if we don't -- and I think the probability is that we won't -- that we are close to stabilization.”
So the worst is over, unless it gets bad again.
From Agora Financial 5 min
Sunday, August 2, 2009
Time to Buy?
It is amazing that anyone would go long an equity market with a reported P/E multiple of 700x but that is indeed what we have on our hands. The end of the recession and the onset of a sustainable recovery, as we saw in 2002, are not the same thing. So this could still end badly but we will await confirmation signs that this is more than a very flashy bear market rally before shifting gears.” ― David Rosenberg, Chief Economist Gluskin, Sheff in a note to clients July 31
Robert Shiller on Charlie Rose
Good interview
Robert Shiller has written a book, Animal Spirits. Looks like an interesting read, it helps explain the economy and markets.
Robert Shiller on Charlie Rose
Posted using ShareThis
Robert Shiller has written a book, Animal Spirits. Looks like an interesting read, it helps explain the economy and markets.
Robert Shiller on Charlie Rose
Posted using ShareThis
Saturday, August 1, 2009
Good Investment for now
"Until opportunities, major ones, present
themselves to me, my money is 100%
parked in bank money-market accounts."
- Irwin Yamamoto
themselves to me, my money is 100%
parked in bank money-market accounts."
- Irwin Yamamoto
The Great Reflation Experiment
From John Mauldin - July 31, 2009
By Tony Boeckh and Rob Boeckh
The Crash of 2008/9 should be seen as yet another consequence of long-term, persistent US inflationary policies. Inflation doesn't stand still. It tends to establish a self-reinforcing cycle that accelerates until the excesses in money and credit become so extreme that a correction is triggered. The bigger the inflation, the bigger the correction. Once a dependency on credit expansion is well established, correcting the underlying imbalances becomes extremely difficult. Reflation has occurred after each major correction, and this one is proving no exception. Return to discipline in the current environment would be too painful and dangerous. Once on the financial roller coaster, it is very hard to get off. Moreover, the oscillations between peaks and valleys become increasingly large and unstable.
Policymakers, money managers, and most forecasters have argued that the crash was a "black swan" event, meaning that it had an extremely low probability of occurrence. That is grossly misleading, as it implies that the crash was so far beyond the realm of normal probabilities that it was unreasonable to expect anyone to have foreseen it. That argument has been used to justify the widespread complacency that prevailed in the years leading up to the crash. Policymakers are still failing to recognize the systemic causes of the crash and seem to believe that enhanced regulation will prevent history from repeating. While it is true that regulators were asleep at the switch or looking the other way, they were not the cause.
The Debt Super Cycle
The real culprit is the US debt super cycle, which has operated for decades, mostly in a remarkably benign manner.
Link to article
By Tony Boeckh and Rob Boeckh
The Crash of 2008/9 should be seen as yet another consequence of long-term, persistent US inflationary policies. Inflation doesn't stand still. It tends to establish a self-reinforcing cycle that accelerates until the excesses in money and credit become so extreme that a correction is triggered. The bigger the inflation, the bigger the correction. Once a dependency on credit expansion is well established, correcting the underlying imbalances becomes extremely difficult. Reflation has occurred after each major correction, and this one is proving no exception. Return to discipline in the current environment would be too painful and dangerous. Once on the financial roller coaster, it is very hard to get off. Moreover, the oscillations between peaks and valleys become increasingly large and unstable.
Policymakers, money managers, and most forecasters have argued that the crash was a "black swan" event, meaning that it had an extremely low probability of occurrence. That is grossly misleading, as it implies that the crash was so far beyond the realm of normal probabilities that it was unreasonable to expect anyone to have foreseen it. That argument has been used to justify the widespread complacency that prevailed in the years leading up to the crash. Policymakers are still failing to recognize the systemic causes of the crash and seem to believe that enhanced regulation will prevent history from repeating. While it is true that regulators were asleep at the switch or looking the other way, they were not the cause.
The Debt Super Cycle
The real culprit is the US debt super cycle, which has operated for decades, mostly in a remarkably benign manner.
Link to article
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