It’s truly amazing. The greatest economic debate of our lifetimes has been solved with “complete confidence” by a former community organizer and civil rights attorney… a student of economics for about a year or two. He is very gifted, this man.
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Yet none our business and political leaders saw the problem coming, nor really understand the problem (remember they have already given over a trillion to big business), they not understand what has caused the problem...but now know the answer....more bail out for big business (some of which will support their overseas operations) and special interest groups!
Now how does that spending add value and helps the North American or world economy?
It does not! And we all know it....but why does this continue?
The answer is.....because we let it. We do not object, we do not say no.
By Martin Wolf
Financial Times: Published: February 10 2009 18:06 | Last updated: February 10 2009 18:06
Has Barack Obama’s presidency already failed? In normal times, this would be a ludicrous question. But these are not normal times. They are times of great danger. Today, the new US administration can disown responsibility for its inheritance; tomorrow, it will own it. Today, it can offer solutions; tomorrow it will have become the problem. Today, it is in control of events; tomorrow, events will take control of it. Doing too little is now far riskier than doing too much. If he fails to act decisively, the president risks being overwhelmed, like his predecessor. The costs to the US and the world of another failed presidency do not bear contemplating.
What is needed? The answer is: focus and ferocity. If Mr Obama does not fix this crisis, all he hopes from his presidency will be lost. If he does, he can reshape the agenda. Hoping for the best is foolish. He should expect the worst and act accordingly.
Yet hoping for the best is what one sees in the stimulus programme and – so far as I can judge from Tuesday’s sketchy announcement by Tim Geithner, Treasury secretary – also in the new plans for fixing the banking system. I commented on the former last week. I would merely add that it is extraordinary that a popular new president, confronting a once-in-80-years’ economic crisis, has let Congress shape the outcome.
The banking programme seems to be yet another child of the failed interventions of the past one and a half years: optimistic and indecisive. If this “progeny of the troubled asset relief programme” fails, Mr Obama’s credibility will be ruined. Now is the time for action that seems close to certain to resolve the problem; this, however, does not seem to be it.
All along two contrasting views have been held on what ails the financial system. The first is that this is essentially a panic. The second is that this is a problem of insolvency.
Under the first view, the prices of a defined set of “toxic assets” have been driven below their long-run value and in some cases have become impossible to sell. The solution, many suggest, is for governments to make a market, buy assets or insure banks against losses. This was the rationale for the original Tarp and the “super-SIV (special investment vehicle)” proposed by Henry (Hank) Paulson, the previous Treasury secretary, in 2007.
Under the second view, a sizeable proportion of financial institutions are insolvent: their assets are, under plausible assumptions, worth less than their liabilities. The International Monetary Fund argues that potential losses on US-originated credit assets alone are now $2,200bn (€1,700bn, £1,500bn), up from $1,400bn just last October. This is almost identical to the latest estimates from Goldman Sachs. In recent comments to the Financial Times, Nouriel Roubini of RGE Monitor and the Stern School of New York University estimates peak losses on US-generated assets at $3,600bn. Fortunately for the US, half of these losses will fall abroad. But, the rest of the world will strike back: as the world economy implodes, huge losses abroad – on sovereign, housing and corporate debt – will surely fall on US institutions, with dire effects.
Personally, I have little doubt that the second view is correct and, as the world economy deteriorates, will become ever more so. But this is not the heart of the matter. That is whether, in the presence of such uncertainty, it can be right to base policy on hoping for the best. The answer is clear: rational policymakers must assume the worst. If this proved pessimistic, they would end up with an over-capitalised financial system. If the optimistic choice turned out to be wrong, they would have zombie banks and a discredited government. This choice is surely a “no brainer”.
The new plan seems to make sense if and only if the principal problem is illiquidity. Offering guarantees and buying some portion of the toxic assets, while limiting new capital injections to less than the $350bn left in the Tarp, cannot deal with the insolvency problem identified by informed observers. Indeed, any toxic asset purchase or guarantee programme must be an ineffective, inefficient and inequitable way to rescue inadequately capitalised financial institutions: ineffective, because the government must buy vast amounts of doubtful assets at excessive prices or provide over-generous guarantees, to render insolvent banks solvent; inefficient, because big capital injections or conversion of debt into equity are better ways to recapitalise banks; and inequitable, because big subsidies would go to failed institutions and private buyers of bad assets.
Why then is the administration making what appears to be a blunder? It may be that it is hoping for the best. But it also seems it has set itself the wrong question. It has not asked what needs to be done to be sure of a solution. It has asked itself, instead, what is the best it can do given three arbitrary, self-imposed constraints: no nationalisation; no losses for bondholders; and no more money from Congress. Yet why does a new administration, confronting a huge crisis, not try to change the terms of debate? This timidity is depressing. Trying to make up for this mistake by imposing pettifogging conditions on assisted institutions is more likely to compound the error than to reduce it.
Assume that the problem is insolvency and the modest market value of US commercial banks (about $400bn) derives from government support (see charts). Assume, too, that it is impossible to raise large amounts of private capital today. Then there has to be recapitalisation in one of the two ways indicated above. Both have disadvantages: government recapitalisation is a bail-out of creditors and involves temporary state administration; debt-for-equity swaps would damage bond markets, insurance companies and pension funds. But the choice is inescapable.
If Mr Geithner or Lawrence Summers, head of the national economic council, were advising the US as a foreign country, they would point this out, brutally. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, IMF managing director, said the same thing, very gently, in Malaysia last Saturday.
The correct advice remains the one the US gave the Japanese and others during the 1990s: admit reality, restructure banks and, above all, slay zombie institutions at once. It is an important, but secondary, question whether the right answer is to create new “good banks”, leaving old bad banks to perish, as my colleague, Willem Buiter, recommends, or new “bad banks”, leaving cleansed old banks to survive. I also am inclined to the former, because the culture of the old banks seems so toxic.
By asking the wrong question, Mr Obama is taking a huge gamble. He should have resolved to cleanse these Augean banking stables. He needs to rethink, if it is not already too late.
Congressional Budget Office to the Senate:
“The principal channel for this effect is that the legislation would result in an increase in government debt. To the extent that people hold their wealth in the form of government bonds, rather than in a form that can be used to finance private investment, the increased government debt would tend to ‘crowd out’ private investment -- thus reducing the stock of private capital and the long-term potential output of the economy.”
We have been told and warned....
According to Bloomberg, that would be about $1 trillion in stimulus bills, over $3 trillion already spent or loaned trough financial rescues, and over $5 trillion committed or promised via some sort of backstop or aid agreement. We’re sure you could come up with some interesting ways to spend that much money… here are a few of ours:
There is a battle being waged now in the world of economics. This battle is fierce. And no matter who wins, the impact will be felt far and wide. I dub this epoch struggle: "Godzilla vs. King Kong"
I'm not sure who will win, but I do have a favorite.
What I'm talking about is the intellectual and tactical battle concerning the best way to deal with the nasty recession engulfing us from a monetary and fiscal policy perspective.
There Are Two Basic
Schools of Thought Here ...
King Kong School — Intellectual Leader is Milton Friedman (Money Supply Theory)
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| Milton Friedman believed that the government should flood the economy with massive amounts of money to enhance and increase consumer demand. |
Basic Premise: In order to keep the current recession from turning into a depression as we witnessed in 1929, the government must stimulate the economy with massive amounts of money so that we can enhance and increase consumer demand.
This is where Mr. Bernanke and President Obama's advisors reside.
Godzilla School — Intellectual Leader is Irving Fischer (Debt-Deflation Theory)
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| Irving Fischer's Debt-Deflation Theory holds that the government must let the invisible cleansing hand of the market wash away the debt before economic growth can resume. |
Basic Premise: In order to keep the current recession from turning into a depression as we witnessed in 1929, the government must step-back and let the invisible cleansing hand of the market wash away the debt before any real economic growth can again take hold in the economy.
Here is the outline for this theory:
My Favorite —
The Good Old Godzilla
And for this primary reason ...
When debt levels reach such huge proportions in an economy, pumping more money into the system is ineffective because the velocity of money declines.
Let me explain the term "monetary velocity" and how important it is:
Monetary velocity means how fast money is circulated in the economy — the speed in which it is spent. And it is a key measure in the definition of economic growth.
Now stay with me ... while I explain this simple equation:M x V = P x O
M = Money Supply
V= Velocity
P = Price Level
O= Economic Output
Ben Bernanke and those in control of U.S. economic policy believe that if the "M" in this equation is lifted, it will impact prices (reduce the deflationary scare) and output (economic growth) accordingly.
But here's the rub: When debt levels become so huge, people get scared. They save, hoard and use their money to pay down debt. They don't take on more debt or run out and spend more just because the money supply has been increased by the government.
In fact, more money pumped into the system only adds to the total debt in the economy, and therefore prolongs the downturn.
The practical policy is to accept the fact that "V" shrinks dramatically at times like these — thus we have the big dip in "O" (output) and "P" (prices).
Here is How the Market
Cleanses the System ...
Debts get paid down; reserves are rebuilt with increased consumer and institutional savings. This provides the eventual pool of capital for fresh growth.
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| At a time of major risk aversion, the world will flock to its reserve currency — the U.S. dollar. |
And once the debt is removed, monetary velocity "V" increases to more normal levels; therefore tinkering with money supply isn't necessary.
Sadly, I think, all governments are on the side of King Kong. And their flood-the-market monetary policies may make this global recession a whole lot worse.
So from a currency perspective I think it means this: We will be locked in a sustained period of risk aversion (rising unemployment, deflation, and sovereign debt defaults) as this crisis plays out. And in a world of major risk aversion, that mantle rests at the feet of the world reserve currency — the U.S. dollar.
President Obama has started to play the "catastrophe" card to sell his economic stimulus plan, using yesterday's terrible January jobs report to predict doom unless Congress acts. No doubt he'll get his way, but the tragedy of this first great effort of the Obama Presidency is what a lost opportunity it is.
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APEveryone agrees that some kind of fiscal stimulus might help the economy, and that running budget deficits is appropriate in a recession. The stage was thus set for the popular President to forge a bipartisan consensus that combined ideas from both parties. A major cut in the corporate tax favored by Republicans could have been added to Democratic public works spending for a quick political triumph that might have done at least some economic good.
Instead, Mr. Obama chose to let House Democrats write the bill, and they did what comes naturally: They cleaned out their intellectual cupboards and wrote a bill that is 90% social policy, and 10% economic policy. (See here for a case study.) It is designed to support incomes with transfer payments, rather than grow incomes through job creation.
This is the reason the bill has run into political trouble, despite a new President with 65% job approval. The 11 Democrats who opposed it in the House didn't do so because they want to hand Mr. Obama a defeat. The same is true of the Senate moderates of both parties working to trim their $900 billion version. They've acted because they can't justify a vote for so much spending for so little economic effect. You know a piece of legislation is in trouble when even its authors begin to deny paternity, as economist Martin Feldstein has recently done.
Speaking to a House Democratic retreat on Thursday night, Mr. Obama took on those critics. "So then you get the argument, well, this is not a stimulus bill, this is a spending bill. What do you think a stimulus is? (Laughter and applause.) That's the whole point. No, seriously. (Laughter.) That's the point. (Applause.)"
So there it is: Mr. Obama is now endorsing a sort of reductionist Keynesianism that argues that any government spending is an economic stimulus. This is so manifestly false that we doubt Mr. Obama really believes it. He has to know that it matters what the government spends the money on, as well as how it is financed. A dollar doled out in jobless benefits may well be spent by the worker who receives it. That $1 of spending will count as economic activity and add to GDP.
But that same dollar can't be conjured out of thin air. The government has to take that dollar away from someone else -- either in higher taxes, or by issuing new debt in the form of a bond. The person who is taxed or buys the bond will have $1 less to spend. If the beneficiary of that $1 spends it on something less productive than the taxed American or the lender would have, then the net impact on growth will be negative.
Some Democrats claim these transfer payments are stimulating because they go mainly to poor people, who immediately spend the money. Tax cuts for business or for incomes across the board won't work, they add, because those tax cuts go disproportionately to "the rich," who will save the money. But a saved $1 doesn't vanish from the economy, unless it is stuffed into a mattress. It enters the financial system, where it is lent to others; or it is invested in the stock market as capital for businesses; or it is invested in entirely new businesses, which are the real drivers of job creation and prosperity.
At the current moment, amid a capital strike, the latter is the kind of fiscal stimulus we really need. Yet there is virtually none of it in the bills now moving through Congress. Senate moderates may succeed in cutting $100 billion or so in spending from the bill, which is political window dressing. Even they aren't talking about adding the kind of tax cuts that would really help the economy now.
We should add how different this is from the 1980s or even the 1960s. Democrats added business tax cuts to the Reagan package of 1981, while Jack Kennedy's chief economist (Walter Heller) promoted marginal rate tax cuts on stimulus grounds in the 1960s. Yet Mr. Obama, on Thursday, dismissed any such tax cuts as "the same tired arguments and worn ideas that helped to create this crisis." That's rhetoric for a campaign, not for a President hoping to rally bipartisan support.
The biggest gamble with this stimulus is what it means if the economy doesn't recover. Monetary policy is already as stimulative as it can safely get, and the Obama Administration is set to announce its big financial fix on Monday. Stocks rallied Friday on expectations of the latter, despite the job loss report, with big bank stocks leading the way. If done right, this will help reduce risk aversion and gradually restore financial confidence.
We hope it does, because the size and waste of the stimulus means we won't have much ammunition left. The spending will take the U.S. budget deficit up to some 12% of GDP, about double the peak of the 1980s and into uncharted territory. The tragedy of the Obama stimulus is that we are getting so little for all that money.
